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TORT AND PROPERTY LAW-THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT SOUNDS THE DEATH KNELL FOR SECTION

14--Si

mon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982).
1.

INTRODUCTION

An issue recently presented to the Massachusetts Supreme Judi

cial Court was whether a landlord could be held liable for a tenant's
emotional distress. This issue arose in Simon v. Solomon, I along
with questions involving warranty of habitability, the covenant of
quiet enjoyment,2 and Chapter 186, Section 14 of the Massachusetts
General Laws. 3
Celeste Solomon was a tenant in a federally subsidized base
ment apartment, managed by Gem Realty Company (Gem).4 On
thirty separate occasions, between April 1974 and November 1976,
raw sewage and water ran into her apartment, covering the floors of
the livingroom, bedroom and hallway.s With flooding ankle deep,
Ms. Solomon testified that she sometimes left her bed at night to
check on her young children only to step into cold sewage and
water. 6 On each occasion, Ms. Solomon would spend the rest of the
night awake, waiting to call Gem so that workers would come to
pump out the apartment.? Although Ms. Solomon suffered no actual
physical injury, she became withdrawn, depressed, and unable to
care for her children. 8 Because of the persistent flooding of the
apartment, Ms. Solomon sent her children to live with relatives and
claimed that she spent much of her time in her bedroom crying,
1. 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982).
2. /d. at 93, 431 N.E.2d at 560.
3. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 14 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). Section 14
supplies remedies for tenants against landlords who fail to provide safe and sanitary
housing. Id. For a discussion of section 14, see infra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
4. 385 Mass. at 93, 431 N.E.2d at 560. Gem was controlled by Maurice Simon, the
original plaintiff, now deceased. Id. at n.l, 431 N.E.2d at 560 n.!. The rent was $313 per
month and Ms. Solomon paid $73 under the subsidy program. Id. at 1I0 n.l3, 431
N.E.2d at 569 n.l3.
5. Brief for Appellee at 3-4, Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556
( 1982).
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 16.
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shunning the outside world. 9
As a result of these conditions, Ms. Solomon stopped paying
rent in November 1976 and, within one month, Gem instituted sum
mary eviction proceedings. 10 Ms. Solomon counterclaimed that Gem
had negligently failed to maintain the apartment and breached its
implied warranty of habitability and implied covenant of quiet en
joyment, thereby causing Ms. Solomon to suffer emotional distress. I I
Additionally, she claimed that Gem inflicted this emotional distress
either intentionally or recklessly.12
In a jury trial before the Housing Court, City of Boston, sum
mary judgment was granted to the landlord regarding the claim of
negligent maintenance. 13 The jury, however, found Gem liable on
the remaining counts and assessed damages of $1000 for the breach
of warranty of habitability, $10,000 for breach of quiet enjoyment,
and $35,000 for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional dis
tress. 14 In addition, Ms. Solomon was awarded $40,000 in attorney
fees pursuant to section 14.15
Gem appealed and the supreme judicial court affirmed the sum
mary judgment on the negligence claim as well as the damage
awards for emotional distress, breach of implied warranty of habita
bility, and attorney fees. 16 The jury award of damages in the amount
of $10,000 for the breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment
was vacated on the basis that it was redundant. 17
This note will trace the development of the warranty of habita
bility and discuss the history of the tort claim of emotional distress in
Massachusetts landlord-tenant law. The purpose and provisions of
section 14, designed to provide safe and sanitary housing, will then
be discussed and the Simon court's application of section 14 will be
evaluated. Additionally, the rejection of the claim for negligent in
fliction of emotional distress will be considered as well as the Simon
court's refusal to hold Gem strictly liable for its breach of the war
ranty of habitability.
9. /d. at 17.
10. 385 Mass. at 93, 431 N.E.2d at 560.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 94, 431 N.E.2d at 560.
14. Id. at 94, 431 N.E.2d at 560-6l.
15. Id. at 94, 431 N.E.2d at 561; see MASS.
1977 & Supp. 1983).
16. 385 Mass. at 95, 431 N.E.2d at 56l.
17. /d. at lI1, 431 N.E.2d at 569-70.
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BACKGROUND

Landlord-Tenant Law in Massachusetts

Landlord-tenant law l8 has changed substantially from the dra
conian principle that in the lease of a building as a dwelling, there
was no covenant implied that the building was fit for habitation. 19
At common law,20 a tenant was required to pay rent, even if the
premises were destroyed, because the land underneath the premises
was considered the primary aspect of the lease. 21 As a result of this
very strict rule and its harsh results, the doctrine of constructive evic
tion evolved. 22 This doctrine "relieved the tenant of his rent obliga
tion if he could show that he had vacated the premises due to a
severe failure of maintenance services amounting to a breach of the
landlord's duty to assure quiet possession."23 The doctrine of con
structive eviction, however, did not help a tenant who desired a hab
itable dwelling. Thus, another exception was carved out of the
common law rule: If the tenant's clear purpose was to obtain habita
ble housing, then the independent covenants rule did not apply.24
The independent covenants rule meant that the tenant's promise to
pay rent was made independently of the landlord's promise to keep
the dwelling habitable; this rule, therefore, prohibited a tenant from
18. See generally, Comment, 20 ANN. SURV. OF MASS. LAW 18 (1973).
19. See, e.g., Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201, 202-03 (1870). This presump
tion was based on the theory that a lease was only a conveyance of real estate and that
the primary purpose of the lease was to have possession of the land and not the building.
Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 188-89,293 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1973).
20. The Hemingway court stated the following as a summary of the common law:
"There is no implied agreement, apart from fraud, that the demised premises are or will
continue to be fit for occupancy or safe and in good repair. The tenant takes the premises
as he finds them and there is no obligation on the landlord to make repairs." Boston
Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 187-88,293 N.E.2d 831, 836 (1973) (quoting
Fiomtino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451,452, 124 N.E. 283, 283 (1919».
21. See generally, Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 188-89,293
N.E.2d 831, 837 (1973); Fiomtino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 452, 124 N.E. 283, 284
(1919); Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201, 202-03 (1870); Comment, supra note 18, at
25-26.
22. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 189,293 N.E.2d 831, 837
(1973).
23. Id. at 189, 293 N.E.2d at 837 (quoting Note, Judicial Expansion of Tenants'
Private Law Rights: Implied Warranties of Habitability and Safety in Residential Urban
Leases, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 489, 491 (1971». Constructive eviction created the fiction
that the tenant had been evicted because his possessory interest in the property had been
ruined by the landlord. The tenant was required to vacate after ascertaining that the
conditions constituted a breach by the landlord. 363 Mass. at 190, 293 N.E.2d at 838.
24. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 190, 293 N.E.2d 831, 838
(1973).
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withholding rent on the basis that the landlord had breached some
obligation.
It was the early rule of Ingalls v. Hobbs,25 that held the in
dependent covenants rule did not apply in a short term lease of a
furnished house as "[i]ts fitness for a particular use ... [was] a far
more important element [in] entering into the contract than when
there [was] a mere lease ofreal estate."26 The court believed the pur
pose of the tenant's leasing was well understood to be for use as
habitation. 27 The limited holding of Ingalls prevailed28 until 1973
when the court, in Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway,29 held
that the Ingalls exception to the common law rule "must now be
come the rule in an urban industrial society where the essential ob
jective of the leasing transaction is to provide a dwelling suitable for
habitation."30 In addition to holding that the rental of any dwelling
25. 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
26. Id. at 350, 31 N.E. at 286. This holding was limited to the special facts of the
short term lease for a furnished room or house. Additionally, the ruling showed a will
ingness by the court to apply the standard of warranty of habitability when it was obvi
ous that the contract was a promise by the landlord to "deliver premises suitable to the
tenant's purpose in return for the tenant's promise to pay rent." Boston Hous. Auth. v.
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 191, 293 N.E.2d 831, 838 (1973).
27. Ingalls, 156 Mass. at 350, 31 N .E. at 286.
28. In Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 129, 163 N.E.2d
4, 7 (1959), the court recognized that a tenant was entitled to damages when a breach of
quiet enjoyment went "to the essence" of the contract even though the tenant had not
abandoned the premises. The court stated:
[s]uch relief is more nearly adequate than the incomplete and hazardous rem
edy at law which requires that the lessee (a) determine at its peril that the cir
cumstances amount to a constructive eviction, and (b) vacate the demised
premises, possibly at some expense, while remaining subject to the risk that a
court may decide that the lessor's breaches do not go to the essence of the les
sor's obligation.
/d. at 129-30, 163 N.E.2d at 7.
29. 363 Mass. 184,293 N.E.2d 831 (1973).
30. Id. at 196-97,293 N.E.2d at 841. The court noted that the urban tenant had no
concern over the land or property interest, but rather, was concerned with the premises.
Id. In addition, the court relied on the rationale advanced in lavins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (2d Cir. 1970). The Hemingway court stated that the ten
ant is no longer a "jack-of-all-trades" like the agrarian farmer and the length of the
tenancy may not justify requiring the tenant to undertake repairs. Further, the court
expressed concern over the complexity of homes and stated that repairs are often expen
sive and difficult, and many times the object in need of repair is totally within the control
of the landlord. Hemingway, 363 Mass. at 197-98, 293 N.E.2d at 841-42 (citing Javins,
428 F.2d at 1078-79). The court further stated that the holdings in Ingalls and Charles E.
Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959); see supra note 8, as
well as legislation establishing minimum sanitary requirements and the statutes devel
oped to enforce those standards, showed a retreat from the "fundamental common law
assumption on which the independent covenants rule [was] based. . . ." 363 Mass. at
194, 293 N.E.2d at 840. In further justification for the change from common law, the
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had an implied warranty of habitability that the premises were suita
ble for habitation, the court stated further that a warranty, to the
extent that it was based on state sanitary codes and local health regu
lations, could not be waived by any provision of a rental agree
ment.31 After these decisions, the court was then faced with
delineating the scope of this warranty.
Within a year after Hemingway, the court made clear in
DiMarzo v. S & P Realty COrp.,32 that Hemingway did not apply to
situations involving the tort liability of a landlord. 33 When faced
with this same issue in Crowell v. McCaffrey 34 five years later, how
ever, the court held that the "extension of the warranty [of habitabil
ity] to the ordinary residential tenancy at will, in accordance with the
Hemingway decision, logically carries with it liability for personal
injuries caused by a breach."35 There have been no major changes
from this position in landlord-tenant law in Massachusetts.
court stated "[t)he task of modifying the existing body oflaw to fit the structural changes
(statutes and legislation) must of necessity be left [to) the courts with the hope that given
an end, they will mould (sic) substantive doctrine to make it effective." Id. at 195,293
N.E.2d at 841 (quoting Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, HARV. LEGAL ESSAYS
(1934».
31. 363 Mass. at 199,293 N.E.2d at 843. The court also stated that conditions not
covered by the Sanitary Code might also be a breach of the warranty of habitability and
that "fitness for human habitation" was not necessarily limited to minimum Code stan
dards. Id. at 200-01 n.16, 293 N.E.2d at 844 n.16. The court did set forth several factors
that were to be considered in determining whether there had been a breach of the im
plied warranty of habitability:
(a) the seriousness of the claimed defects and their effect on the dwelling's
habitability;
(b) the length of time the defects persist;
(c) whether the landlord or his agent received written or oral notice of the
defects;
(d) the possibility that the residence could be made habitable within a reason
able time; and
(e) whether the defects resulted from abnormal conduct or use by the tenant.
Id. at 200, 293 N.E.2d at 843-44 (footnotes omitted).
32. 364 Mass. 510,306 N.E.2d 432 (1974).
33. Id. at 514, 306 N.E.2d at 434. The court noted that the justification for the
change in landlord-tenant contract rules was the uncertain validity of the common law
stance that a lease was a conveyance of real estate. Id. (citing Boston Hous. Auth. v.
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973». The court also stated that
"[w)hatever the contractual liability, there could be no tort liability for non-feasance in
the absence of an agreement, for consideration, that the landlord would keep the prem
ises in a condition of safety, and make all repairs without notice." 364 Mass. at 513, 306
N.E.2d at 434.
34. 377 Mass. 443, 386 N.E.2d 1256 (1979).
35. 377 Mass. at 451,386 N.E.2d at 1261; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY § 17 Reporter's note to Introductory note to ch. 17 (1977).
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B. Emotional Distress and Tort Law in Massachusetts

In 1897, it was stated, in Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railway Co .,36
that "in an action to recover damages for an injury sustained
through the negligence of another there can be no recovery for bod
ily injury caused by ... fright and mental disturbance."37 The
court, however, left open the question of whether mental suffering
that was caused intentionally or recklessly with "utter indifference"
was actionable. 38 This question was left unanswered for seventy
four years. 39
The element of speculative damages has been a great concern of
courts and the denial of infliction of emotional distress as an in
dependent tort has been based upon a fear of fraudulent or frivolous
claims,40 a concern over the difficulty in proof of causation,41 and a
possible flood of litigation.42 But, recovery was granted as courts
began to recognize the severe injury incurred by plaintiffs. Instead
of basing the recovery on emotional distress, however, relief was
based upon theories of false imprisonment, trespass, nuisance, inva
sion of privacy, and technical assault. 43
36. 368 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
37. Id. at 285, 47 N.E. at 88. Justice Allen further stated:
we remain satisfied with the rule that there can be no recovery for fright, terror,
alarm, anxiety, or distress of mind, if these are unaccompanied by some physi
cal injury; and if this rule is to stand, we think it should also be held that there
can be no recovery for such physical injuries as may be caused solely by such
mental disturbance, where there is no injury to the person . . . without.
Id. at 290, 47 N.E. at 89. This language exemplifies what is referred to as the "impact
requirement", which Justice Holmes viewed as "an arbitrary exception, based upon a
notion of what is practicable [and this] prevents a recovery for visible [injury] resulting
from nervous shock alone." Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 457, 62
N.E. 737, 737 (1902).
38. See Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 456, 62 N.E. 737, 737
(1902), where Justice Holmes discussed the Spade decision.
39. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
40. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 170,472 P.2d 509, 519 (1970); Hatfield v.
Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 849, 606 P.2d 944, 953 (1980); Harrison v.
Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 379 Mass. 212, 217, 396 N.E.2d 987, 990 (1979); Dziokon
ski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 559, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1299 (1978); Samms v. Eccles, II
Utah 2d 289, 291, 358 P.2d 344, 345 (1961); W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS, § 54, at 329 (4th ed. 1971); Hochman, "Outrageousness" and Privilege in the
Law 0/ Emotional Distress-A Suggestion, 47 CORNELL L. Q. 61, 61 (1961).
41. See Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 563, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1299 (1978);
Samms v. Eccles, II Utah 2d 289, 291, 358 P.2d 344, 345 (1961).
42. See W. PROSSER, supra note 36, at § 50. "[E]ven at the expense of a 'flood of
litigation' . . . it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of a
jurisdiction to deny relief on such grounds." Id.
43. Prosser,Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 42-43 (1956). See Interstate
Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937) (technical battery
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Finally, in George v. Jordon Marsh Co .,44 the court recognized
emotional distress as an independent tort and held that "one, who,
without privilege to do so, by extreme and outrageous conduct, in
tentionally causes severe emotional distress and bodily harm even
though he has committed no heretofore recognized common law
tort" may be held liable. 45 The court noted that the element of spec
ulation was not any greater than in the usual tort claim where evi
dence was offered and the issue of causation was required to be
weighed with great care. 46 The George court, however, declined to
rule as to whether conduct that was negligent, grossly negligent, or
wanton and reckless, that caused severe emotional distress and also
resulted in bodily injury, was legally sufficient to state a cause of
action. The court left open the question of the legal sufficiencies of
such distress unaccompanied by bodily harm. 47
The question of whether a claim for emotional distress could be
supported without accompanying physical injury arose in the lead
ing case ofAgis v. Howard Johnson CO.48 The court inAgis held that
a plaintiff could recover for emotional distress inflicted intentionally
or recklessly even though there might not be accompanying bodily
injury.49 The court listed the specific factors that a plaintiff would be
found after insurance claims adjuster tossed a coin on bed of a woman suffering heart
condition; because battery had been found, the woman was allowed to recover for dis
tress caused by other attempts by adjuster to scare her with accusations of fraud and
goldbricking); Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., 228 N.Y. \06, 126 N.E. 647 (1920)
(emotional distress recovery allowed because trespass found where hotel employee went
into hotel room and accused married couple of immoral conduct); see also Samms v.
Eccles, II Utah 2d 289, 291, 358 P.2d 344, 345 (1961) ("[A] realistic analysis . . . will
show that the recognized tort is but incidental and that the real basis of recovery is the
outraged feelings and emotional distress resulting from some aggravated conduct of the
defendant."); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 278, 596 S.W.2d 681, 686 (1980)
(court admitted giving emotional distress damages when that was the only substantive
damage suffered but attempted to find another tort on which to hang its hat).
44. 359 Mass. 244,268 N.E.2d 915 (1971).
45. Id. at 255, 268 N.E.2d at 921. In justifying its position the court stated:
The right to recover. . . damages should not be denied just because they do not
fit in any of the existing niches in the ancient walls surrounding the law of torts.
If the current needs of society require and justify so doing, the walls may be
extended and additional niches built to accomplish justice.
Id. at 250, 268 N.E.2d at 918.
46. Id. at 251,268 N.E.2d at 919 (quoting Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352
Mass. 446, 448-49, 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1967».
47. 359 Mass. at 255, 268 N.E.2d at 921.
48. 371 Mass. 140,355 N.E.2d 315 (1976).
49. Id. at 141, 355 N.E.2d at 317. In this case the plaintiff, a waitress, was sum
moned to a meeting along with all the other waitresses. At the meeting the defendant
manager of the corporation informed the waitresses that stealing was occurring and that
they did not know who was responsible. The manager continued by stating that until the
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required to prove,50 and stated that if each of these factors were
proven, the chances of frivolous or fraudulent claims would be
minimized.51
The tort claim of emotional distress has changed significantly
since the restrictive stance of Spade. George and Agis demonstrate
the court's willingness to consider the expansion of this claim. The
evolution has been laborious, however, indicating that future expan
sion promises to be similar.
C.

The Statute

Section 1452 is part of a statutory scheme that supplies remedies
for tenants as against landlords who fail to provide safe and sanitary
housing.53 The purpose of the section is "to facilitate enforcement of
State housing regulations and to provide relief for tenants deprived
of decent homes."54 Specifically, a landlord who is required by any
implied or express provision of the lease or contract to supply certain
services,55 may not willfully or intentionally interfere with the fur
nishing of that service either by direct or indirect means. 56 Land
lords are also proscribed from interfering in any way with the
tenant's quiet enjoyment. 57 While section 14 provides for criminal
person was caught, he would begin to fire all the waitresses in alphabetical order. The
plaintiff was promptly fired. /d.
50. The Agis court established four elements that a plaintiff must show before re
covery may be had:
(I) that the actor [defendantI intended to inflict emotional distress or that he
knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his
conduct; . . . (2) that the conduct was "extreme and outrageous" . . .; (3) that
the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiffs distress . . .; and
(4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was "severe" . . . .
/d. at 144-45,355 N.E.2d at 318-19 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 145, 355 N.E.2d at 319. The court stated" '[ilt is for the jury, subject to
the control of the Court,' to determine whether there should be liability. . . ." Id. (quot
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46 comment h (1965». The standards of Agis
were applied in the Simon case. See supra note 50 and infra note 68 and accompanying
text.
52. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 14 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983); see supra note
3.
53. 385 Mass. at 100, 431 N.E.2d at 564.
54. Id. at 101,431 N.E.2d at 564 (citing Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363
Mass. 184,293 N.E.2d 831 (1973».
55. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 14 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). The services
enumerated are water, hot water, heat, light, power, gas, elevator service, telephone serv
ice, janitor service and refrigeration service. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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penaities,58 it also creates an independent civil action. 59 Therefore, if
found guilty of a violation, the landlord is liable for actual and con
sequential damages, or three months rent, whichever is greater. 60
When section 14 was first enacted, portions of the statute, "fail
ure to provide services" and "interference with quiet enjoyment" re
quired intentional or willful conduct. 61 When it was re-written,
however, the words intentional and willful were deleted from the
quiet enjoyment phrase. 62 In interpreting this act of the legislature,
the supreme judicial court has stated that specific intent63 was no
longer required when a landlord had interfered with a tenant's quiet
enjoyment, and that unsanitary conditions could cause harm regard
less of whether or not the landlord had acted intentionally.64 Courts
in Massachusetts have imposed liability upon the landlord "when
ever the 'natural and probable consequence' of the landlord's action
was [an] interruption of the tenant's rights."65
There have only been three cases involving section 14 on ap
peal,66 as most decisions of the housing courts have been left undis
turbed. Those cases, which include Simon, are highly significant due
to the interpretation given to section 14 by the supreme judicial
court. 67
58. Id. The criminal penalties are imprisonment up to six months or a fine not to
exceed $300 but not less than $25. Id.
59. Id. The statute provides for civil liability to be imposed on those who violate
its provisions. Id. The Simon court stated that a landlord need not be convicted for a
criminal violation before a tenant could state a civil cause of action against the landlord
because that would defeat the utility of the statute to the tenant who was attempting to
enforce the provisions. 385 Mass. at 100,431 N.E.2d at 564.
60. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 14 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). This provi
sion guarantees a minimum amount of damages to a successful tenant in the event that
the actual damages suffered were minimal. If a tenant were to be only compensated for
actual damages, and those damages were slight, the tenant might not litigate. The triple
rent damage provision encourages landlords to comply with the statute. Simon, 385
Mass. at Ill, 431 N.E.2d at 569; see infra notes 158-172 and accompanying text.
61. Simon, 385 Mass. at 101,431 N.E.2d at 564 (citations omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 101-102,431 N.E.2d at 564.
64. Simon, 385 Mass. at 101,431 N.E.2d at 564.
65. Id. at 102,431 N.E.2d at 565 (citing Blackett v. Olanoff, 371 Mass. 714, 358
N.E.2d 817 (1977); Westland Hous. Corp. v. Scott, 312 Mass. 375, 44 N.E.2d 959 (1942);
Shindler v. Milden, 282 Mass. 32, 184 N.E. 673 (1933».
66. See Wolfberg v. Hunter, 385 Mass. 390, 432 N.E.2d 467 (1982); Simon v. Solo
mon, 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982); Darmetko v. Boston Hous. Auth., 378 Mass.
758, 393 N.E.2d 395 (1979).
67. See infra notes 158-172 and accompanying text.
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Simon
1.

Emotional Distress

The Simon court was confronted with several issues, the first of
which concerned whether Gem recklessly inflicted emotional distress
upon Ms. Solomon. In applying the standard set forth in Agis,68 the
court rejected Gem's argument that it was not the proximate cause of
Ms. Solomon's injuries. 69 Gem's argument that causation had not
been established was based upon several facts. First, a plumber had
examined the building's two waste stacks and plumbing system, and
had found them to be in good repair and in compliance with the
state plumbing regulations. 70 Second, the source of the flooding was
unclear, and although some back-ups did occur, uncontroverted tes
timony indicated that the condition was caused by objects discarded
by other tenants through the plumbing system or roof vents.7 1 Gem,
therefore, asserted that it acted reasonably in its maintenance of the
plumbing and was not responsible for the flooding that caused Ms.
Solomon's injuries. 72
The court found, however, that Gem's arguments regarding the
plumbing did not correctly state the scope of duty owed by Gem to
its tenants. 73 The court stated that it had firmly established that
landlords renting residential dwellings guaranteed that the premises
would be habitable,74 and that at the very least, this was a duty to
keep the premises in compliance with state sanitary codes. 75 More
over, the court noted that there was evidence at trial which indicated
that the wall between Ms. Solomon's apartment and the adjoining
basement area was porous. 76 Because Gem contemplated cementing
the wall but did not do so, the court determined that a jury could
reasonably find Gem's failure to cement was the proximate cause of
68. See supra note 50.
69. 385 Mass. at 95-96, 431 N.E.2d at 56!.
70. Id. at 95,431 N.E.2d at 56!.
7!. Id.
72. Id. at 96, 431 N.E.2d at 56!.
73. Id. One court has stated that the primary issue in emotional distress litigation
is that of duty. "[DJuty ... is a legal conclusion which depends upon 'the sum total of
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is
entitled to protection.'" Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii, 156, 170, 472 P.2d 509, 518
(1970) (citing W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 53, at 332 (3d ed.
1964».
74. 385 Mass. at 96, 431 N.E.2d at 561 (citing Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway,
363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973».
75. 385 Mass. at 96, 431 N.E.2d at 561 (citations omitted).
76. Id.
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Ms. Solomon's injuries. 77 In addition, because the state sanitary
code requires apartments to be water tight,78 the court stated that
Gem incorrectly focused its causation argument on the relationship
between its conduct and the flooding rather than on the relationship
between the flooding and the injuries sustained. 79
Having found that Gem had violated its duty by failing to pre
vent the flooding of Ms. Solomon's apartment, the court then stated
that there was ample evidence to support the requisite elements 80 in
a cause of action for reckless or intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 81 Because testimony given at trial revealed that Ms. Solo
mon continually complained of the flooding and that Gem sent a
clean up crew each time, the court determined that a jury could find
that Gem had notice. 82 As a result, Gem knew, or should have
known, that floods of sewage water would cause emotional distress. 83
The court stated further that because the flooding occurred numer
ous times over an extended period, the jury was also justified in its
finding of reckless conduct84 because the indifference displayed by
Gem amounted to outrageous behavior.85
77. Id. at 96-97, 431 N.E.2d at 562 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 97, 431 N.E.2d at 562 (citing MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. lOS, § 410.000
(1978».
79. 385 Mass. at 97 n.3, 431 N.E.2d at 562 n.3.
80. See supra note 50.
81. 385 Mass. at 97, 431 N.E.2d at 562.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 97, 431 N.E.2d at 562.
84. The elements required in an intentional or reckless infliction of emotional dis
tress as set forth in Agis, see supra note 50, is an adoption of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46 (1977). Recklessness, as applied to Section 46, is defined as follows:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an
act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do,
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man
to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical
harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which
is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
Id. § 500. Section 500 states that there must be present a "conscious disregard or indif
ference" to that risk. Id. at comment a. This definition of reckless applies to Section 46
when the acts are in deliberate disregard of a high probability that emotional distress will
occur. Id. § 46, at 77.
85. 385 Mass. at 97, 431 N.E.2d at 562. Section 46 of the Restatement states that
"[o)ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if
bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46 (1977). Section 46 was adopted by Massachusetts courts in Agis. 371
Mass. at 145, 355 N.E.2d at 319. Section 46 further states:
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is
tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress or
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Although the claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis
tress against Gem was affirmed, Ms. Solomon appealed the summary
judgment granted against her on her claim of negligent mainte
nance. 86 The court stated that it did not recognize a cause of action
for negligent infliction of emotional distress without physical in
jury.B1 It concluded that it need not decide that issue in Simon nor
whether the legislature intended to authorize a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress under section 14.88 Further, while the
court also refused to decide whether the tenant could recover for
emotional distress under a theory of strict liability,89 it noted that
Ms. Solomon had not shown that she was entitled to additional re
covery even if recovery under a lesser standard of culpability was
available. 90
2.

Section 14 and Damages

Ms. Solomon invoked section 14 as a counterclaim to Gem's
summary eviction proceeding. 91 In interpreting section 14, the court
rejected Gem's argument that a criminal conviction was necessary
before a civil action was instituted,92 and that in a claim of interfer
ence of quiet enjoyment, specific or malicious intent was unneces
sary.93 Gem argued further that it had been found liable for the
actions of third parties and that these actions were beyond its con
tro1. 94 This argument, similar to Gem's causation argument regardeven that his conduct has been characterized by "malice" or a degree of aggra
vation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, at comment d (1977). The comment states fur
ther that liability should be found only when the conduct in question is "so outrageous in
character, so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id.
86. 385 Mass. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 562.
87. Id. (citing Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690
(1980); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); McDonough v.
Whalen, 365 Mass. 506, 313 N.E.2d 435 (1974); Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry. Co., 168
Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897».
88. 385 Mass. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 563.
89. See infra notes 138-154 and accompanying text.
90. 385 Mass. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 563. Ms. Solomon argued that the warranty of
habitability imposed strict liability upon landlords for the injuries caused when unsani
tary conditions were present. Id.
91. Id. at 94, 431 N.E.2d at 560. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
93. See 385 Mass. at 102, 431 N.E.2d at 564-65.
94. I d. The actions of third parties claimed were related to Gem's reliance on the
testimony that tenants had introduced foreign materials into waste stacks and had used
washing machines in apartments. /d. at 103,431 N.E.2d at 565.

1983]

LANDLORDS, TENANTS, AND DAMAGES

181

ing the issue of reckless infliction of emotional distress,95 was
rejected on the basis of duty:96 the flooding could have been pre
vented, and Gem had a duty to prevent it,97
The court granted limited review on the issue of damages 98 and
affirmed all of the damages 99 except the $10,000 award for breach of
Ms. Solomon's quiet enjoyment, which was held to be redundant,loo
The court stated that the primary cause of confusion leading to the
redundancy arose from the jury instruction. lOl The trial judge below
had instructed that for interference of quiet enjoyment, the jury was
to consider the statutory awards provided under section 14. Addi
tionally, for breach of warranty of habitability, the jury was in
structed that damages may be awarded for the difference between
the rent paid and the value of the premises in its inhabitable condi
tion. 102 The jury was further instructed that lost income, medical
expenses and pain and suffering were to be considered in assessing
damages for reckless infliction of emotional distress. As a result of
these instructions, the Simon court believed that, because the jury
awarded damages under all three provisions, duplication of damages
necessarily followed. 103 The court noted that if the jury had based
the award for interference with quiet enjoyment upon actual damage
suffered, then that award duplicated the damages granted for the lost
rental value in the warranty of habitability as well as for the inflic
tion of emotional distress. 104 The court, therefore, determined that
the $10,000 award for breach of quiet enjoyment was not justified
under section 14 because triple rent damages were to be awarded
See supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
96. See supra note 73; infra text accompanying note 114.
97. 385 Mass. at 103,431 N.E.2d at 565 (citations omitted); see infra note 142 and
accompanying text.
98. 385 Mass. at 108, 431 N.E.2d at 568. The court limited its review of the dam
ages awarded by the trial court to the issue of whether the award was supported by the
evidence because Gem did not object at the time of the jury instruction. Since Gem filed
timely motions for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
however, limited review was granted. ld. at 107-08, 431 N.E.2d at 568.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
100. 385 Mass. at 108,431 N.E.2d at 568.
101. Id. These damages were to be actual and consequential damages, or three
months rent, whichever was greater. The judge instructed that actual and consequential
damages should include rent that was paid over the value ofthe apartment, as well as lost
income due to the injury sustained and damages for emotional distress. Id. at 109, 431
N .E.2d at 568.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
95.
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only when actual damages were less than the tripled rent. 105
Additionally, the court affirmed the attorney fees awarded to
Ms. Solomon in the amount of $40,000. 106 Gem argued that legal
fees were granted to Ms. Solomon regarding her count of emotional
distress, which was not part of her statutory claim.107 The court,
however, dismissed this argument by stating that the delineation of
claims did not affect the rights of the plaintiff and that the provision
for actual and consequential damages suggested an intent by the leg
islature to include all reasonable foreseeable damages. lOS Because it
was found at trial that Gem knew or should have known that the
floods would cause emotional harm and that Ms. Solomon's injuries
were foreseeable, the emotional distress award was within the range
of section 14 and was properly included in the consideration of attor
ney fees. 109 The fees were found to be reasonable and the court ad
ded that because judges are given broad discretion in such awards,
their findings are not to be disturbed unless they are completely
erroneous. I 10
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Emotional Distress

There is no question that Ms. Solomon suffered severe emo
tional distress as a result of Gem's actions. The straight-forward ap
plication ofthe standard set forth inAgis-111 was proper, and the only
serious contention raised was that of causation. I 12 The court's appli
cation of a duty owed by a landlord to a tenant, which emphasized
that causation was found between the flooding and Ms. Solomon's
injuries rather than between the conduct of the landlord and the
flooding, was proper in light of the theory of warranty of habitability
and its purpose. I 13 If the court had allowed Gem's causation argu
ment to prevail, it would have absolved Gem of all liability for the
105. Id; see Darmetko v. Boston Hous. Auth., 378 Mass. 758, 393 N.E.2d 395
(1979); see infra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.

106. 385 Mass. at 113,431 N.E.2d at 570-71.
107. Id. at 111,431 N.E.2d at 570. "A statutory fee award should not cover effort
expended on independent claims that happen to be joined with statutory claims in a
single proceeding." Id. (citing Hanner v. Classic Auto Body Inc., 1980 Mass. App. Adv.
Sh. 1219,406 N.E.2d 686).
108. 385 Mass; at 111-12, 431 N.E.2d at 570.
109. Id. at 113,431 N.E.2d at 570-71.
110. Id. (citations omitted).
Ill. See supra note 50.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 69-77.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
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extensive suffering and injury of Ms. Solomon. Because duty is a
legal conclusion,114 the Simon court essentially decided that, based
upon policy considerations, Ms. Solomon was entitled to protection
from Gem.lls Without such a duty imposed on landlords by the Si
mon ruling, recalcitrant landlords might be encouraged to ignore
problems in apartments if they are unable to ascertain the location of
the problem. This would put tenants in the untenable position of
knowing that, although wrongful conduct had been committed, there
was no one at whom they could point a finger. In such a case, a
tenant would be at his landlord's mercy, thereby defeating the pur
pose of section 14.116
While the court affirmed Ms. Solomon's claim for reckless in
fliction of emotional distress, it refused to recognize a cause of action
for negligent infliction of emotional distress without attendant physi
cal injury.117 Several reasons for this denial were enunciated in Pay
ton v. Abbott Laboratories .118 First, in a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, the emotional disturbance that is not
so severe as to have physical impact is likely to be "so temporary, so
evanescent and so relatively harmless" that allowing recovery would
overburden both defendants and courts. I 19 Second, such claims are
too easily imagined or faked when the guarantee of genuineness rep
resented by physical injury is missing. Third, if the degree of culpa
bility is mere negligence, the defendant should not be burdened by
liability for emotional distress. 12o These reasons are very similar to
justifications espoused as support for disallowing any type of dam
ages for any emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury. 121
Other courts have disagreed that the claim of negligent inflic
tion of emotional distress should be disallowed simply because there
is no physical injury. The California Supreme Court, in Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 122 stated that while courts wanted to
See supra note 73.
See w. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 53 at 325-26.
See supra text accompanying note 54.
117. 385 Mass. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 562 (citing Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass.
555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); McDonough v. Whalen, 365 Mass. 506, 313 N.E.2d 435
(1974); Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897».
118. 386 Mass. 540, 552, 437 N.E.2d 171, 179 (1982).
114.
115.
116.

119.

/d.

120. /d. at 553, 437 N.E.2d at 179.
121. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
122. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813,167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). In Molien, the plain
tiff and his wife belonged to the Kaiser Health plan. When Mrs. Molien went in for a
routine physical, the doctor informed her that she had syphilis. Mr. Molien was brought
in for blood tests and Mrs. Molien was required to undergo treatment. Subsequently, it
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avoid fictitious and fraudulent claims, drawing a line at negligence
was not necessarily a justifiable rationale. 123 The Molien court be
lieved that there were two major problems in allowing intentional
and reckless infliction of emotional distress while disallowing a neg
ligence claim. 124 First, such a distinction was overinclusive because
it permitted recovery for emotional distress when there was physical
injury regardless of whether that injury was minimal. Further, it
was underinclusive because such a distinction systematically denied
recovery to valid and genuine claims. Second, the requirement of
physical injury itself resulted in encouraging "extravagant pleading
and distorted testimony."125 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Utah
stated
[that] if the right to recover for injury resulting from the wrongful
conduct could be defeated whenever such dangers [of fraud] exist,
many of the grievances the law deals with would be eliminated.
That some claims may be spurious should not compel those who
administer justice to shut their eyes to serious wrongs and let them
go without being brought to account. It is the function of Courts
and juries to determine whether claims are valid or false. This
responsibility should not be shunned merely because the task may
be difficult to perform}26

Hawaii in Rodrigues v. Slale, 127 also abrogated the physical in
jury requirement. There, the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated that a
general standard was needed for testing the validity of such
claims.128 Factors to be considered in determining the genuineness
of claims included the sophistication of medical testimony as well as
was discovered that the doctor's diagnosis was in error. The plaintiff alleged as a result
of the negligent diagnosis, his wife became upset, suspicious and the marriage broke
down. Id. at 921, 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
123. Id. at 927, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
124. Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
125. /d. at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
126. Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961).
127. 52 Hawaii, 156,472 P.2d 509 (1970). In Rodrigues, the plaintiffs were horne
owners who resided on a lot separated from the highway by an unimproved parcel of
land. A culvert ran under the highway emptying onto the parcel. The plaintiff informed
the state that the culvert often clogged and during heavy rains water would build up on
his land. The state highway department assured the plaintiff that everything would be
fine and told the plaintiff to call if flooding looked imminent. One night, during a storm,
the plaintiff called the state and warned that flooding looked certain. The state workers
arrived five hours later by which time the home was flooded with six inches of water
causing extensive damage to the plaintilfs house and furnishings. Id. at 159,472 P.2d at
513.
128. /d. at 172,472 P.2d at 519.
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the quality and genuineness of the proof presented to the court.129
Additionally, the ability of the court and the jury to see through dis
honest claims, according to the Rodrigues court should be a consid
eration. 130 The court further reasoned, "[ilt can no longer be said
that the advantages gained by the courts in administering claims of
mental distress by reference to narrow categories outweigh the bur
den thereby imposed on the plaintiff."131 Rodrigues then adopted
the standard that serious mental suffering would be recognized when
a "reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to ade
quately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances
of the case."132
The foregoing reasoning should have been applied to the facts
of Simon. It is unreasonable to presume that Ms. Solomon's injuries
were lessened by the culpability of the defendant's conduct and there
is no doubt that she had a valid claim. Additionally, Gem breached
its duty whether it acted negligently or recklessly. The emotional
distress suffered by Ms. Solomon was not increased by reckless con
duct any more than it was decreased by negligent conduct. On the
other hand, if there had been accompanying physical injury, such as
a cut which had become infected, the court would have most likely
allowed the cause of action. 133 In a case such as Ms. Solomon's,
where there is a valid claim, a plaintiff must pray for a physical
injury in order to recover for her genuine and valid negligently in
flicted emotional harm. Moreover, requiring physical injury encour
ages extravagant pleading and distorted testimony. In the
hypothetical of the infected cut, much time and evidence would be
lent in support of the physical injury in an attempt to justify the
emotional distress. 134 Most courts have deleted foreseeabilit y 135 as
the sole criteria in emotional distress cases,136 although some courts
are still citing foreseeability and defendant's lesser degree of culpa
bility as sufficient reasons for denying negligent infliction of emo
tional distress.137 The real reason is fear of fraudulent and frivolous
claims rather than the articulated justifications advanced.
129. Id. at 172,472 P.2d at 519-20 (quoting Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152
N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1958».
130. 52 Hawaii at 172,472 P.2d at 520.
131. /d. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520.
132. Id. at 173,472 P.2d at 520.
133. See Simon, 385 Mass. at 96, 431 N.E.2d at 562.
134. See Mollen, 27 Cal. 3d at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
135. W. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 12, at 51.
136. Payton, 386 Mass. at 553, 437 N.E.2d at 178.
137. W. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 12, at 50.
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B. Strict Liability-Warranty of Habitability
The question of whether a landlord could be held strictly liable
for a breach of warranty of habitability was also addressed by the
Simon court. Ms. Solomon argued that proof of negligence should
not be necessary in the landlord-tenant relationship.138 The court
stated initially that the warranty of habitability 139 contemplated a
minimum requirement that the landlord keep the dwelling in con
formity with the state sanitary code. 140 The court did not hold that a
landlord could be held strictly liable, but rather, it noted that a land
lord could be held liable for the tenant's injuries at least when the
landlord had not exercised reasonable care. 141 It is uncertain
whether the court made the narrower statement because Gem's con
duct had already been held to be reckless,142 or if it was because
negligence was an element required to be proven.
The rationale for adopting strict liability in the landlord-tenant
context is based on several factors.143 The landlord has superior
138. 385 Mass. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 563; see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
140. 385 Mass. at 96, 431 N.E.2d at 561.
141. Id. at 96, 431 N.E.2d at 562 (citing Crowell v. McCaffery, 377 Mass. 443, 450
51,386 N.E.2d 1256, 1260 (1979» (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying notes
74-75.
142. 385 Mass. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 562. In Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 379
Mass. 196,200-01,396 N.E.2d 981, 984-85 (1979), the court declined to decide the ques
tion of whether a finding of negligence was a necessary prerequisite for imposing liability
upon a landlord for failure to maintain compliance with minimum housing standards.
/d. (citing Crowell v. McCaffery, 377 Mass. 443, 386 N.E.2d 1256 (1979». In Berman,
the landlord argued that to impose strict liability would penalize a landlord who acted
reasonably and would create a hopeless duty especially since neither the landlord nor the
tenant expected perfect upkeep when there were system breakdowns and time needed for
repairs. Therefore, the landlord argued that the law should correspond to reality. 379
Mass. at 199-200,396 N.E.2d at 984. The court responded by stating that "[a] tenant has
a right to expect that the landlord will comply with the law. It is this right we protect."
Id. at 199-200 n.6, 396 N.E.2d at 984 n.6. The court further stated that "[c]onsiderations
of fault do not belong in an analysis of warranty." Id. at 200, 396 N.E.2d at 984.
Berman, therefore, indicates that the court is willing to view a strict liability imposi
tion favorably. Commentators have suggested that there are a number of reasons why an
imposition of strict liability in the landlord-tenant context is valid.
The adoption of the implied warranty of habitability was premised in large part
on product liability and analogies. If a lease is a contract to provide goods and
services, these same products liability precedents suggest that a landlord (like a
builder-vendor of real property, seller of used property, provider of commercial
services, or lessor of personal property) should be held strictly liable for per
sonal injury or property damage caused by a defect in the premises.
Love, Landlord's Liabilitylor Difective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence or Strict Lia
bility, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 19, 160.
143. Id. at 155.
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knowledge and is in a better position to prevent defects. Also, the
landlord is in a better position to bear and distribute losses through
liability insurance, thus spreading the ultimate cost on to all tenants.
Finally, a strict liability standard eliminates the need for proving
negligence, an important factor since it may be impossible for the
tenant to prove that the landlord knew or should have known about
the defect. 144
There are also those who strenuously advance reasons for deny
ing the imposition of strict liability on landlords. 145 First, it has been
asserted that an apartment has several rooms with many facilities,
thus making it difficult to ascertain who is responsible for the defect
or its source. 146 Many jurisdictions, however, imply a warranty in
new homes on the builder-vendor of real property despite the com
plexity of the product. 147 In fact, it is "this very complexity that has
justified the imposition of strict liability because it is impossible for
the average purchaser to detect even dangerous defects in construc
tion."148 A second criticism is that an apartment is subject to con
stant use and deterioration and is therefore "used" property.149 Still,
the landlord is in a better position to inspect for defects and deter
mine a need for repair. An additional consideration is the fact that
courts have been willing to hold sellers of used property strictly lia
ble. 150 A third reason for denying the imposition of strict liability
upon landlords is that the lease is an agreement to provide services
and therefore the theory of strict liability is inapplicable. 151 The serv
ices of the landlord, however, are more commercial than profes
sional in nature, and therefore, such an immunity to strict liability
should not apply.152 A final rationale is that a lease is not a sale, but
most jurisdictions have not made a distinction between sellers and
non-sellers of personal property. 153 Like a retailer or manufacturer,
the landlord places his product, the apartment, in "the stream of
commerce." Moreover, because he controls the length of the lease, a
landlord can prevent the circulation of a defective product. 154
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

fd.
fd.
fd.
fd.
fd.
fd.
fd.
fd.

at
at
at
at

156.
137.
137 n.674.
138.

at 138-39 n.680.
at 139 n.683.
/d. at 140.
fd.
fd. at 142.
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As the foregoing discussion indicates, the reasons advanced for
the imposition of strict liability upon landlords are more persuasive
than those advanced for not establishing such a liability. Despite the
logic of imposing strict liability, the Massachusetts courts have de
clined to do so.
C.

f)amages

Ms. Solomon's award of $10,000 for interference with quiet en
joyment was vacated on the basis of redundancy. 155 Although this
resulted in part from the confusing instructions issued by the trial
judge to the jury,156 it is clear that the court's interpretation of sec
tion 14 was also important in this determination. 157
In interpreting damages recoverable under section 14, the court
relied heavily upon f)armetko v. Boston Housing Authority.15s In
f)armetko, the lower housing court had applied the triple rent clause
of section 14 in awarding damages for a leaking roof. 159 The housing
court awarded three times the monthly rent for each month the roof
had remained unrepaired. 160 In reviewing the interpretation of sec
tion 14, the f)armetko court stated that section 14 provided for actual
and consequential damages or three months rent, and that there was
no indication of legislative intent that each month in which a viola
tion occurred should be considered separately. 161 This conclusion
severely limited damages awarded under the statute as well as less
ened the punitive aspects to the landlord. 162 The Simon court's read
ing of section 14, however, further limited the damages recoverable
under that section. In holding that a tenant could receive only one
award of triple rent regardless of the number of violations,163 the
court stated that the triple rent damage provision was an incentive to
tenants to seek damages. 164 Once such an award had been granted,
155. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
156. Id.
157. 385 Mass. at 110-11, 431 N.E.2d at 569.
158. 378 Mass. 758, 393 N.E.2d 395 (1979). In Darmetko, the tenant claimed that
defects existed in the kitchen and living room floors, in addition to the fact that the roof
leaked, bringing water into the closet and the living room. Id. at 759, 393 N.E.2d at 397.
159. Id. at 760, 393 N.E.2d at 397.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 762, 393 N.E.2d at 398 (emphasis added).
162. In Darmetko, the damage award by the housing court was three times the
monthly rent for each month the roof remained unrepaired for a total of $5,358. Under
the supreme judicial court's interpretation of section 14, the damages were reduced to
$141. Id. at 761-62, 393 N.E.2d at 398.
163. 385 Mass. at 110,431 N.E.2d at 569.
164. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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that incentive had been fulfilled. 165 The court too quickly dismissed
Ms. Solomon's argument that such a restrictive reading would effec
tively immunize landlords from future violations. The court rea
soned that a tenant could institute another proceeding if a new
violation arose after the initial suit. 166 A hypothetical will illustrate
the difficult situation the court has created by its rulings in Darmetko
and Simon.
A, a tenant, pays $100 per month in rent. At the beginning of
month one, the roof begins to leak (violation one). At the end of the
same month, the electricity is turned off (violation twO).167 These
remain unrepaired for three months. Prior to the Darmetko holding,
the successful litigating tenant could have potentially recovered
$1800,168 but because of Darmetko, the tenant's potential award is
reduced to $600. 169 With the further limitation of Simon, which per
mits only one triple rent damage award per suit, regardless of the
number of violations, if the tenant institutes a proceeding at the end
of the third month, the potential award is only $300,170 If the tenant,
however, instituted proceedings for the violation of the leaking roof
before the electricity shut-off occurred, the tenant could institute a
second proceeding against the landlord for the second violation and
receive $600.171
As indicated by this hypothetical, the court has essentially
placed the burden on the plaintiff-tenant to institute proceedings in a
timely fashion as well as encouraged litigation rather than settle
ment. In addition, once there is a violation, a landlord who knows
that there are minimal actual damages, is assured of a maximum
165. 385 Mass. at 110,431 N.E.2d at 569.
166. ld. at 111, 431 N.E.2d at 569.
167. For purposes of the hypothetical, assume both examples are violations and
both are resulting from the fault of the landlord.
168. Before Darmetko, the tenant could recover for both violations. For the first
violation (the leaking roof), the calculation would be as follows: three times the monthly
rent of $100 ($300) multiplied by each month unrepaired (3) equals the appropriate
award ($900). The second violation, the electrical shut-off, would be calculated in the
same manner for another $900, yielding a total of $1800.
169. The Darmetko court stated that each month the violation occurred or contin
ued should not be treated separately. 378 Mass. at 762, 393 N.E.2d at 398. Therefore,
the first violation would be calculated as follows: three times the monthly rent of $100,
which equals $300. The second violation would be calculated in the same manner for a
total of $600.
170. The Simon court held that the triple rent clause was to be used only in cases
where the actual damages were less than three months rent. Additionally, the violations
were not to be considered separately. 385 Mass. at 109-11, 431 N.E.2d at 569. As a
result, the damages would total $300.
171. See supra t~xt accompanying note 166.
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award to the tenant of only three months rent regardless of the
number of violations that he commits. This anomalous result also
will be difficult for the housing courts, because if a new violation
occurs after the initial suit is filed, the tenant may institute a second
proceeding.172 Thus, it is possible that a tenant could have two or
more related actions in process at the same time. This will burden
the tenant, the landlord and the court. If the two actions are consoli
dated, the $imon court's ruling appears to limit the tenant to a total
possible award of three months rent and immunize the recalcitrant
landlord. Thus, the Simon court's interpretation and application of
the damage award under section 14 has emasculated the use of that
section for tenants claiming minimal damages and permits immuni
zation for irresponsible landlords. Such a result is inconsistent with
the purpose of the statute which was to ensure decent housing and to
protect tenants. 173
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Simon v. S%mon,174 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court was requested to decide questions involving the warranty of
habitability, the tort claim of emotional distress and the interpreta
tion of Chapter 186, Section 14 of the Massachusetts General
Laws. 175
The Simon court affirmed damages for breach of warranty of
habitability, stating that in Massachusetts it was firmly established
that landlords renting residential dwellings guaranteed that the
premises would be habitable. Further, at the very least, this was a
duty to keep the premises in compliance with state sanitary codes.
The court declined to decide the question of whether strict lia
bility was applicable in a landlord violation of warranty of habitabil
ity. Although the court has yet to decide this issue specifically,
contemplating a minimum requirement that the dwelling be habita
ble indicates the court's willingness to do so favorably. The justifica
tions advanced for strict liability are compelling since the landlord
has superior knowledge, is in a better position to bear the loss, and is
making a profit from the renting venture. Although a strict liability
theory is not fully analogous because a lease is not a sale, the land
172. 385 Mass. at Ill, 431 N.E.2d at 569.
173. See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
174. 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 566 (1982).
175. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 14 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
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lord controls his "product", the apartment, and it is he who puts the
product into the stream of commerce.
In affirming Ms. Solomon's emotional distress damages, the
court found that the landlord acted recklessly with extreme and out
rageous behavior, that these actions caused the injuries, and that the
injuries were severe. The court, however, affirmed the dismissal of
Ms. Solomon's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
stating that the Massachusetts courts have not recognized such a
cause of action unless accompanied by physical injury. In rational
izing this position, the supreme judicial court has stated that in a
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim without physical in
jury, such emotional harm is likely to be so temporary and relatively
harmless that allowing recovery would burden defendants and
courts. The court has expressed concern that such claims would be
too easily imagined, and the lack of physical injury takes away the
guarantee of genuineness that the court desired. Finally, the court
did not believe that the degree of the defendant's culpability in a
negligence case warranted imposing a liability for possible emotional
harm. Notwithstanding the policy concerns advanced by the court,
Ms. Solomon's injuries were severe whether as a result of negligent
or reckless conduct. The fear of fraudulent claims is not a valid rea
son for denying recovery: the court should take the responsibility of
determining the validity of a claim and not merely close its eyes to
the problem.
The Simon court also interpreted Chapter 186, Section 14 and
stated that its purpose was to ensure decent housing and to protect
tenants. In its interpretation, however, the court held that only one
recovery of the triple rent clause was available in a proceeding. The
court's interpretation of section 14 in both Simon and Darmetko has
essentially emasculated the use of the statute to tenants who claim
only minimal damages. In addition, this interpretation has effec
tively immunized irresponsible landlords.
Simon represents part of a growing trend that is holding land
lords liable for tenants' injuries-both physical and emotional. De
spite this, the limitations placed upon tenant recovery under section
14, indicates the court's concern with maintaining some balance in
the landlord-tenant relationship.
Melinda Wilkins Hunkins

